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THE INTERNATIONAL FACTORSIN GERMAN
AIR TRANSPORTt
By DR. GERD RINCKtt
I. INTRODUCTION

F

OR THE SMALLER, closely grouped countries such as Germany, the
superiority of air travel is best demonstrated over the long distances
of international transport. The question therefore arises as to the extent
the States take into account the international character of aviation and
more precisely if they have different rules for national and international
air transport. Few fields of human activity lend themselves more readily
to unification of the law than does aviation.
The preponderantly international character of aviation could shape the
law in five main respects: (1) with reference to the status of the air carrier,
(2) in administrative control (regulating prices of or admission to air
transport), (3) in international cartels and trusts, (4) in official bilateral
agreements, and, finally, (5) with reference to the system of liability
between carrier and user.' The purpose of this article is to present an
overview of Germany's response to these five areas.
II.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF AIR CARRIERS IN GERMANY

Neither the Aviation Act' nor the Regulations for the Admission to
Aviation' provide for a specified legal status of the carrier. Since Germany
is left without a specific rule, the applicant who desires to undertake
transportation by air must prove his economic capacity. Experience under
the relevant regulation indicates that a corporation is generally the only
applicant with the requisite economic capacity to undertake the business
of transportation by air. Under this regulation the applicant must submit
(1) evidence of his economic capacity, (2) on demand by the authority,
the by-laws of the corporation, including the most recent balance sheet,
and (3) data concerning the company's capital structure. There is, however, no rule limiting air carriers to corporate enterprises. There are instances where individual businessmen have been allowed to conduct air

services.
t German national report to the Seventh Congress of Comparative Law, held at Uppsala, Sweden,
6-13 August 1966. The original German version was published in 1966, Zeitschrift fuer Luftrecht
und Weltraumrechtsfragen (ZLW). The instant version was slightly amended to be brought up to
the date of 1 August 1966.
tt Professor of Law, Goettingen University, Federal Republic of Germany.
' By this arrangement the author has followed the recommendations of the rapporteur g~nhrale,
Professor Carl H. Fulda.
2 Law of 22 Oct. 1965, Luftverkehrsgesetz (LuFTVG), in BUNDESGESETZBL I, 1729 (Ger. 1965).
3 Law of 19 June 1964, Luftverkehrszulassungsordnung, in BUNDESGESETZBL I, 370 (Ger. 1964).
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In order to establish the business of an air carrier, a certificate of admission is required. This must be granted unless "facts justify the assumption that public safety and order may be endangered." This formula is
common in German economic law, and corresponds with the general
clause which the public authorities and police utilize in securing public
safety and order. Technical as well as economic inefficiency may constitute
a danger to public safety. If, however, no facts to that effect can be
proved, the applicant must be admitted. While the wording of the act does
not clearly establish this right, the German constitution requires free
access for everyone to every trade or profession unless evidence is shown
that such trade or profession would violate law or public order." Since
every applicant has a right to be admitted to air transportation, there is
no room for discretion by the authority' with regard to the consideration
of such an application.
It is the undisputed policy of the Federal Republic that the government must provide adequate transportation facilities for everyone. Transportation is considered a public utility for which the state is responsible.
This point of view is effectively applied in all European States. Scheduled
common carriers, therefore, are state-owned in practically all European
countries with the exception of Swiss Air and SAS, of which seventy
and fifty percent respectively are held as private property.! In Germany,
Lufthansa is the only enterprise which offers scheduled services in intrastate as well as in international traffic. Lufthansa is a joint stock company
whose shares are seventy-five percent owned by the federal government
and, to a small extent, by state agencies. In 1966, when twenty-five percent of the stock was sold to the public,' the shares experienced a remarkable increase in trading. During the first nine years of its existence,
Lufthansa had suffered deficits which were covered by loans from the
federal government. When, in 1964-1965, the balance sheets showed gains,
the loans given by the government were transformed into capital stock'
with the result that Lufthansa is no longer a debtor but a private corporation of which seventy-five percent is owned by the government. The
company is managed strictly on business principles with a supervisory
board consisting largely of officials and other state representatives. Aside
from this board, the government has no possibility to intervene in the
business of "its own" company.
Of the other fifteen carriers' presently providing non-scheduled services
and charter flights in the Federal Republic, probably the largest is CondorFlugdienst GmbH, whose shares are fully owned by Lufthansa. In essence,
therefore, the air transport business in the Federal Republic is carried on
as a state-owned public utility organized in a big joint stock company.
43 BACHOF, GRUNDRECHTE pt. 1, at 164, 222 (1958).
Gimbel, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 19 (1963).

'Die

Zeit, 30 April 1965, p. 33.

'Frankfurter
'Frankfurter
'See

Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 Sept. 1965; and 5 March 1966.
Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 June 1965.

REuss, JAHRBUCH DER. LUFTFAHRT 286-95

(1965).
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Only a small section of the non-scheduled air services is strictly in private
hands.
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL IN GERMAN AIR TRANSPORT

As an additional requirement to the general license of the carrier,
scheduled services need a special permission for each route."0 The permission may be denied if the scheduled service in question would be
contrary to the "public interest." This rule, however, is in remarkable
contrast to the section of the law dealing with non-scheduled services.
Although the latter requires no license, they may, however, be subjected
to certain conditions or restrictions. The supervisory authority may even
forbid the establishment of some routes (but not the non-scheduled
services as a whole). These restrictions are legal if such services are, in
substance, judged to be contrary to the "public interest in transportation."
This differenciation between "public interest" for scheduled services and
public interest in transportation" for non-scheduled services is a play on
words and disappears when closely scrutinized.
A. Licensing Of Scheduled Services
The question arises as to whether these licensing regulations are in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 1 of the German constitution, which
guarantees free access to every trade and profession. Nevertheless, every
scheduled air service is dependent on previous licensing, and the license
may be denied if the service in question is found to be contrary to the
public interest. The requirements as to what constitutes public interest
are based on allegedly objective data upon which the applicant cannot
possibly have any influence. Even if the applicant possesses first-class
qualifications and proves the highest effiiciency, the access to air transportation will be barred unless these requirements are met. This is an absolute
restriction for admission11 which, according to the Federal Constitutional
Court," is of a legal nature only when applied by the competent authorities in defense against serious dangers to some overwhelming public interest. This legal doctrine, established by the highest court in Germany,
is now generally accepted. Applied to transportation it must be said that
the nation has a great interest in regular services by rail, bus, and air."3
Moreover, adequate transportation facilities by air are a matter of such
overwhelming public interest 4 that absolute restrictions for admission may,
therefore, be legal.
With regard to the railways, it is recognized by all German courts1
OLuFTVG, § 31, para. 1 (Ger.).

The federal constitution was amended in order to allow for

federal administration in aviation, § 87(d) of the Grundgesetz, as amended, 6 Feb. 1961.
11 Gimbel, op. cit. supra note 5, at 19. But see Graumann, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1487

(1963), where it is suggested that not the access to the trade but merely the details of trading

be restricted.
"Judgment of 11 June 1958, vol. 7, p. 377, 408.
"sFederal Constitutional Court decree, 8 June 1960, vol. 11, p. 168, 184 (transport by car).
14Gimbel, op. cit. supra note 5, at 19 n.13.
"See, e.g., Federal Constitutional Court, vol. 16, p. 147, 148; Federal Administrative Court,
vol. 18, p. 113, 115; and Federal Civil Court, vol. 26, p. 42, 46.
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that they must serve unprofitable lines and, therefore, deserve protection
on profitable ones. The losses originated from unprofitable lines are reduced
by gains from the profitable services. Because the railways in Germany
are owned and run by the State, it is a matter of public interest that the
burden on the public budget be reduced by profits from other lines. It is,
therefore, compatible with the constitution if competition is reduced or
excluded by state intervention on the profitable lines. The same considerations apply to Lufthansa. It serves the public interest, hence its losses
were, up to 1963, covered by the federal budget. The general interest,
therefore, demands not only that adequate air transport be offered, but
also that the burden on the public finance be reduced as far as possible.
It is, therefore, legal that new lines be permitted only if they will not
impair the financial interest of Lufthansa.'
B. The Public Interest In Transportation
The public interest comprises considerations of general policy and transport policy as well as legal tradition and even aspects of social policy (i.e.,
support of smaller enterprises)." The aviation act keeps within this large
framework by allowing State intervention in non-scheduled services provided that "the public interest in transportation" is endangered.
The Federal Constitutional Court itself approved the formula of "public
interest in transportation," which the legislature defined more precisely
in an act regulating the transportation of persons."8 According to that act,
the public interest in transportation is endangered if the present means of
transportation are sufficient to meet the demand or if the existing enterprises declare their readiness to establish new lines to meet a still unsatisfied demand. Those are the detailed consequences to be derived from
the general concept of public interest in transportation. Lower courts
have accepted these regulations as constitutional." It must be admitted
that this interpretation of the constitution and of the various acts favors
those enterprises and airlines which are already in business and hampers
the newcomers. This is, however, an inevitable consequence of the consideration of the public interest in transportation. To date the compliance
of this interpretation with the constitution has not been questioned."
The courts will decide in a particular case whether or not the "public
interest in transportation" is rightly interpreted. If a license is denied to
a newcomer, the authority must prove that the newcomer would threaten
the existence of Lufthansa or at least its financial stability.

C. Scheduled And Non-Scheduled Services
Since any damage to Lufthansa would be contrary to the public interest,
"8Abraham,

1954 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER LUFTRECHT

151

[hereinafter

ZLR]; Gimbel, ot. cit.

supra note 5, at 21 n.28.
" Federal Constitutional Court, vol. 17, p. 232, 243; vol. 13, p. 97, 113.
'" Law of 21 March 1961, [1961] Personenhefoerderungsgesetz § 13, para. 2 (Ger.), which was
prompted by and is in accord with the decree by the Federal Constitutional Court of 8 June 1960,
vol. 11, p. 168, 191.
"FILITZ, MEIER & MONTIGEL, PERSONENBEFOERDERUNGSESETZ § 13 n.9 (1963).
'Conlra, BIDINGER, PERSONENBEFOERDERUNGSGESETZ § 13 n.36 (1961).
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non-scheduled air services may be subject to conditions or restrictions,21
and some applications may even be refused. However, as a matter of legal
principle, non-scheduled services need no permission. They are merely
subject to State interference."
Scheduled services may pose a more serious threat to Lufthansa. It is,
therefore, appropriate that scheduled services should require a previous
permission. For scheduled and non-scheduled applicants the examination
must be the same: the license for scheduled services and the restriction
on non-scheduled services depend on the interpretation as to what constitutes the public interest in efficient and profitable transportation facilities.
This interest is prejudiced if the new service is meant to meet a demand
which is already served by Lufthansa or will soon be served by it. The
conclusion, therefore, is that there is no substantial difference between
the "public interest" standard applied to scheduled carriers and the "public
interest in transportation" standard applied to non-scheduled applicants.
In German law there is no difference between national and international
scheduled services, nor between national and international non-scheduled
services. The public interest in transportation, however, requires the public
authority to consider the condition of the industry already existing in
Germany. Foreign airlines have no absolute right to be admitted. German
sovereignty and the national interest oblige the federal government to
protect the profitability of national airlines rather than foreign airlines.
However, international law may create situations where the Federal
Republic will have to consider foreign interests. Bilateral agreements may
grant foreign airlines a right to be admitted to service within the Federal
Republic. These agreements require the consent of the legislature under
Article 59, paragraph 2 of the constitution. If consent is given, the agreement is the equivalent of a national act and has precedence over the special
permission required for a scheduled carrier. If, therefore, a bilateral agreement conveys to a foreign airline the right to operate in Germany, then
the admission may not be denied as contrary to the public interest. In
this regard law and practice are less strict in Germany than in the United
States.

D. Tariffs And Conditions
Tariffs, time schedules, and conditions of contracts must be approved
for every route. This control, exercised by the Federal Ministry of Transport, has not caused any difficulty nor has it prejudiced international
transportation because the authorization is always given if tariffs, time
schedules, and conditions correspond to International Air Transport Association (IATA) resolutions.
Actually, all bilateral agreements entered into by the Federal Republic
refer to IATA resolutions. These agreements expressly state that licenses
21Meyer, 1954 ZLR 248; Rinck, 1954 ZLR 152; Graumann, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
1488 (1963); Abraham, 1954 ZEITSCHRIFT FVER LUFTRECHT UND WELTRAUMRECHTSFRAGEN
[hereinafter ZLW]. Contra, Gimbel, op. cit. supra note 5, at 20.
"Darsow, 1959 ZLR 84.

151
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and permissions shall be granted on an IATA basis. This does not mean,
however, that the Federal Republic subjects itself to present and future
IATA resolutions. The IATA resolutions shall merely be considered, but
in practice they are followed. In this way, the Federal Republic follows the
pattern of the Bermuda Agreement 3 and the recommendations made by
the Strasbourg-European Aviation Conference of 1929.2
As for non-scheduled services, German law does not expressly provide
that tariffs and conditions need previous approval by an authority. In
this respect non-scheduled services are free from regulations; but if their
operations prove contrary to public interest, the Federal Ministry of Transport may subject them to the conditions and restrictions discussed above.
This provides a way in which tariffs and conditions of transport could
be prescribed even for non-scheduled services.2 ' However, as of now,
this has not been done.'
IV.

APPROVAL OF

IATA

RESOLUTIONS

The International Air Transport Association is probably the biggest
international cartel in all fields of economic life with more than ninety
airlines as members. In its special traffic and tariff conferences, fares, time
schedules, and conditions of contract are agreed upon. Resolutions as well
as recommendations require unanimity of the members concerned. 7 While
recommendations have no binding force, disregard of resolutions carries
penalties up to $25,000. The IATA statutes take into account that an
airline may, under its national law, be obliged to submit all IATA resolutions to domestic authorities for approval. Every member of IATA must
inform all other members if such a domestic authorization is required.
If the national authority refuses the approval, the resolution becomes void
as against all IATA members. Such instance occured in 1964, when IATA
had forbidden its members to show films during flight. This resolution
was not approved by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
and, therefore, never came into force. If an IATA resolution is approved
by national authorities under conditions or restrictions, the other IATA
members must decide within thirty days whether the resolution shall be
void or whether it shall be binding upon all members with the restrictions
or conditions incorporated. The latter attitude is the rule.
There is no conflict between German law and IATA procedure. The
antitrust law of the Federal Republic does not apply, and the airlines may
engage in restrictive practices or agreements as far as international air
transport is concerned. With reference to national transport, the law
against restrictive trade practices permits cartels in all these fields where
"Annex No. 2 (b), (d), reproduced in 3

MEYER, LUFTFAHRTABKOMMEN
560 (1962).
2 Art. 7 No. 2; CHENG, OP. cit. supra note 23, at 244.
'RINCK, FESTSCHRIFT FUER RIESE 503 (1964).
26 Rudolf, 1964 ZLW 215.

LAW

OF INTERNATIONAL

AIR

302; CHENG, THE

TRANSPORT

27
IATA, ARTICLES Or ASSOCIATION 61 (6th ed. 1964) (art. 7(1), provisions for traffic conferences).
2 IATA, MANUAL OF TRAFFIC CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS No. 001 (1965).
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the tariffs or conditions of contract are subject to government approval.
Since this approval is required under German law the result is that restrictive trade practices are allowed with reference to tariffs and conditions of contract. It is sufficient that agreements of these cartels or their
restrictive practices (i.e., the fares and time schedules) are controlled by
the Federal Ministry of Transport." The federal antitrust authority has
control over abusive practices in international, but not in national air
transport. No intervention by the antitrust authorities has yet occurred.
All IATA resolutions concerning tariffs, conditions, or time schedules
require government approval under German law. As a rule, this approval
has been given, so that Lufthansa conducts its business exclusively under
IATA tariffs and conditions of contract." In that connection the words
"conditions of contract" have a wide meaning. They include even the
admission of agents and air freight forwarders.
When asked to approve IATA resolutions the Federal Ministry of
Transport need only consider the public interest. The conflicting interests
of competing carriers or agents cannot be considered by the government.
Therefore, if approval is given, no individual, carrier, or air freight forwarder will be heard in court."' It is doubtful whether or not regulations
for the transport of dangerous goods such as nuclear or inflammable matter
can be regarded as conditions of contract and, therefore, subject to government approval. This problem, however, has no practical bearing since by
Article 27, paragraph 1 of the constitution such dangerous goods may
be carried with special permission only. Those IATA resolutions in this
field that have been accepted by the Federal Ministry of Transport have
become obligatory for all German services, even for those carriers who
are not IATA members. Therefore, these IATA regulations are part of
the German law."
V. GERMAN

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AIR
TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS

If a State subsidizes its national airline, it is only natural that the government try to shield that airline from foreign competition. This situation
exists in practically every State including Germany. Foreign airlines,
therefore, need permission for each service they plan. This principle is

laid down in Article 6 of the Chicago Convention.
All endeavors to weaken this citadel of sovereignty in air space have
failed. Some liberalization was introduced by the Transit Agreement of
7 December 1944," which allows innocent passage through the air space
"'See RINCK, op.

cit. supra note 25, at 502, 506.

80The conditions of carriage formulated by IATA are no longer binding; they are not even
recommended. 1 SCHLEICHER, REYMANN & ABRAHAM, LUFTVERKEHRSRECHT 417 (1960).
02
Administrative Court (Cologne), 4K 996/63, 24 Aug. 1964.
2 Notification by the Federal Minister of Transport, 21 March 1961; Notice to Airmen, B
28/61.
'This

was ratified by the federal government on 12 Oct. 1956, in BUNDESGESETZBL

(Ger. 1956).

II, 934
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of all contracting States and authorizes landings for technical purposes.'

Foreign aircraft, however, are not allowed to debark or to embark passengers or freight. This right was to be granted by the so-called Transport
Agreement which has become obsolete because the United States withdrew
from it on 25 July 1946 due to its lack of general acceptance. Only noncommercial aviation is free from these restrictions. Transport is noncommercial if it carries neither passenger nor cargo or mail for remunera-

tion, or on the basis of hire or charter. Commercial aviation on the other
hand comprises scheduled and non-scheduled services for remuneration.
A. Non-Scheduled Services
Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Chicago Convention seems to allow the
debarcation and embarcation of passengers, freight, and mail. In fact,
however, all States subject this commercial transportation to conditions
and restrictions. Under these practices the freedom of aviation, which
should be the rule, has become the exception. Nevertheless, no State may
go so far as to exclude all foreign non-scheduled aviation for that would
be contrary to the spirit of article 5, paragraph 2.' The wording of the
section seems to allow a general prohibition, but it must be disregarded in
view of the underlying principles of the convention.' The States do,
however, subject foreign non-scheduled services to discretionary permission.
The Paris Agreement " on commercial non-scheduled air services in
Europe attempts to remedy the situation but its economic importance
is negligible. Generally, the agreement allows:
(1) taxi-flights only up to six seats per plane,
(2) flights for which a person has chartered the whole capacity of the plane
without hiring out parts of it,
(3) other flights, but only once a month between the same places, and
(4) freight transportation by air until revoked.

The agreement applies only among members of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) who are identical with the members of the

Council for Europe in Strasbourg.
B. Scheduled Services
It appears that international scheduled aviation, by far the most important part of transport by air, remains without any general international regulation. Only the rights of transit flights and technical landings
are granted by the Transit Agreement. Permission for commercial landings
must be obtained for each airline from all States concerned. This permission is always a matter of intensive bargaining. Here, prestige and
protectionist interests of the States combine to produce the narrow and
' Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), 7 Dec. 1944, art. 1, § 1,
61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. 1591 (effective 4 April 1947). See also CHENG, Op. cit. supra note 23, at
536; 1 SCHLEICHER, REYMANN & ABRAHAM, op. cit. supra note 30, at 81; 3 MEYER, Op. cit. supra
note 23, at 106, 108.
RIEsE, LUFTREcHT 137 (1949). 1 SCHLEICHER, REYMANN & ABRAHAM, Op. cit. supra note
30, at 34, 239; CHENG, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 179 (ICAO resolution of 10 May 1952).
" Contra, MEYER, LUFTKECHT IN FUENF JAHRZEHNTEN 300 (1961).
" The agreement is fully discussed in 5 RIESE, SCHRIFTENREIHE DEs LUFrFAHRTBEIRATS (1959).
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unsystematic network of bilateral agreements." This method leads to slow
and hard bargaining for each service, and the result is a diversified and
disunified law which is difficult to survey."
As far as can be ascertained, the first bilateral agreement ever concluded was entered on 14 September 1920 between Switzerland and Germany." The slow process of negotiation was speeded up somewhat in 1952
when the Federal Republic of Germany agreed "to pursue in its bilateral
air transport agreements and arrangements a liberal and non-discriminatory
policy" towards the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.41
By mid-1965 the Federal Republic had concluded thirty-five air transport
agreements. From the bilaterals, three models have evolved.

1. The InternationalCivil Aviation Organization Standard
This is a relatively short model agreement. It was included in the final
act of the Chicago Conference as recommendation Number VIII.' The
model does not describe the commercial rights in detail but does grant
exemption from customs and provide for reciprocal recognition of licenses
and air worthiness certificates. The aircraft are subject to the law of the
landing State.

2. The Bermuda Model
Difficult and economically important points are disregarded in the ICAO
model. Problems arise with regard to the transportation capacity which
may be offered, the tariffs, and the transportation between one of the
contracting states in relation to third countries. These highly important
questions were first discussed and partly solved in the Bermuda Convention which was concluded between the United States and the United
Kingdom."' It incorporated the idea that the capacity offered shall correspond to the demand for transportation between the contracting state
and the country of final destination. Moreover, the capacity should also
correspond to the demand in the intermediate countries "taking into consideration" the regionally scheduled services. With regard to the tariffs,
the contracting states undertake to come to an agreement for which the
IATA tariffs shall serve as a non-committal basis.
This agreement was a true compromise between the two great opponents
in transportation policy, the United States, who advocated free admission
and unlimited competition, and the United Kingdom, who favored planned
and protected air transport." The Bermuda compromise was reached only
by inserting a great number of formulae with little or no precision.
Nevertheless, this agreement created a new type of pattern, and after38 See Schmidt, Die wirtschaftlich-politische Ordnung des internationalen Luftlinienverkehrs
(1965) (analyzing the opposing interests and their possible solutions).
' 5 RinsE, op. cit. supra note 37, at 149.
40 12 FORSCHUNGSSTELLE

FUER VOELKERRECHT 3 (Hamburg

1951).

4' Law of 26 May 1952, 23 Oct. 1954, ch. XII, art. 3, in BUNDESGESETZBL II, 405, 456 (Ger.

1955).
42 CHENG, Op. Cit.

"id.

at 554.
4Id. at 23, 238.

suftra note 23,

at 504.
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wards the great majority of all bilateral agreements, including Germany's
followed suit.

3. The Strasbourg Standard Clauses
The latest model for bilateral agreements was recommended in 1959
by the European Civil Aviation Conference.' It is based on the ICAO
model of 1944 and embodies the rules agreed upon in Europe over the
course of years. The Strasbourg model does not mention the controversial,
but decisive points concerning the transportation capacity to be offered.
It follows the Bermuda Agreement only insofar as it recommends in rather
cautious language the IATA tariffs.
C. The Bilateral Agreements Of The Federal Republic
Of the thirty-five bilaterals entered into by the Federal Republic up
to 1 July 1965, roughly twenty-five are similar in concept, content, and
wording. They follow the Strasbourg standard clauses. Note, however, that
many of the agreements were concluded prior to the Strasbourg model
which, apparently, they have influenced.
A second, smaller group of bilateral agreements is equally based on the
German standard, but shows considerable modification from case to case.
This group comprises agreements with Australia (22 May 1957), Brazil
(29 September 1960), Iran (1 July 1961), India (15 June 1964), and
Chile (30 March 1964). However, even these six agreements follow, to a
large extent, the Strasbourg standard clauses.
Four of the agreements were apparently the result of special bargaining and do not fit any of the models. This applies to the agreements with
the United States (7 July 1955), Great Britain (22 July 1955), and
France (4 October 1955). Those are the oldest agreements entered into
by the Federal Republic and, at the same time, they are the most important
from a commercial point of view. Also out of pattern is the agreement
Number 4 with Yugoslavia (10 April 1947), probably because Yugoslavia
has little in common with the western economic system.
Any attempt to categorize the agreements according to their substance
results in many groupings and overlapping stipulations. One central point
in all of the agreements is the problem of the amount of transport capacity an airline shall be allowed to offer abroad. The German standard
follows closely the Bermuda Agreement. A good example is the agreement
with Belgium,' apparently the first to be based on the supposed German
standard clauses. All the agreements mentioned above, except the atypical
agreement with France, have accepted the Bermuda rule as to the capacity
to be offered.
VI.

THE LIABILITY OF THE AIR CARRIER

With regard to the liability of the air carrier, the Federal Republic
4

1

id. at 241.

"Law

of 14 April 1956, art. 9, in BUNDESGESETZBL II, 45 (Ger. 1957).
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makes no distinction between national and international transportation.
Germany has ratified the Warsaw Convention,"' The Hague Protocol, 8
and the Convention of Guadalajara. 9 Furthermore, the Federal Republic
has incorporated the substantive rules of these conventions into German
law so as to apply even to transportation outside the scope of these three
conventions. The rules, therefore, are the same for all national and international transportation by air.
However, German law did not incorporate the Warsaw regulation for
delay in transport. If, therefore, transportation is outside the scope of
that convention, the carrier may stipulate to exclude any liability for
delay." The regulations for transportation documents (Articles 3 to 16
of the Warsaw Convention) were also excluded from the German law.
The competent aviation authority, however, has authorized Lufthansa to
make its conditions of contract comply with those of IATA." The result
is that the transportation documents are always exactly the same as provided for under the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, only in a few instances were the rules of the Warsaw Convention supplemented by German
national law.
A. Gross Negligence And Wilful Misconduct
The original version of the Warsaw Convention provided for unlimited
liability if the carrier or its servants and agents caused the damage by
conduct adjudged to be equivalent to wilful misconduct. This standard,
which is much debated in other legal systems,"' has always been construed
as referring to "gross negligence."" The German courts, without exception,
have held the same view and have imposed unlimited liability on the
carrier in cases of gross negligence."'
Article 25 in the original version of the Warsaw Convention was unsatisfactory because it allowed different interpretations from country to
country, and it did not undertake a substantive unification of the law,
but referred to national law only. Therefore, The Hague Convention
introduced a new standard by which unlimited liability arises if the carrier
or its servants or agents caused damage recklessly "by a deliberate act ...
done with intent to cause a damage." This seems to be a version of wilful
misconduct which the German law describes as "conscious negligence."'"
When the German legislature ratified The Hague Protocol and, at the
same time, undertook to extend its principles for transportation outside
II, 1039 (Ger. 1933).
"REICHSGESETZBL
4sBUNDESGESETZBL II, 291 (Ger. 1958).
49BUNIDESGESETZBL II, 1159 (Ger. 1963).
0

See Rinck, 1958 ZLR 306.
511 SCHLEICHER, REYMANN & ABRAHAM, op. cit. supra note 30, at 60, 416.
2
1d. at 366-69.
53DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES 204 (1954); Abraham, 1954 ZLR 711; Rinck, Recent
Developments in German Air Law, 23 J. AIR L. & CoM. 485 (1956).
"Bundesgerichtshof, 17 April 1958, vol. 27, p. 101, 106 (1958 ZLR 421, 424); Landgericht
Koeln, 9 April 1964 (1965 ZLW 88, 89); Landgericht Frankfurt/M., 8 March 1939, Archiv fuer
Luftrecht 1939, p. 180.
"SMemorandum to the Hague Protocol submitted to Parliament by the Federal Republic,
Bundestagsdrucksache 111/220, at 32, 20 Feb. 1958; 1 SCHLEICHER, REYMANN & ABRAHAM, op.
cit. supra note 30, at 395.
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of the convention, it did not introduce the rule of conscious negligence
but instead retained the concept of gross negligence." There may be cases
in which gross negligence is proved without any doubt-e.g., extreme
lack of knowledge, or unusual forgetfulness-but not conscious negligence
as formulated in the new version of Article 2 5 of the Warsaw Convention.

Since German national law already imposes liability without monetary
limits in cases of gross negligence, domestic liability is more severe than
that under The Hague Protocol.
B. Accident Insurance For Passengers
All air carriers licensed in the Federal Republic are required to insure
their passengers against injury and death up to $8,750 per passenger. Thus,
passengers are in two respects in a better position than under the Warsaw
Convention: the sum is paid irrespective of the cause of the accident, even
if the carrier could invoke the defense that neither it nor its servants and
agents had been in a position to avert the accident; and the full amount
is paid in cases of death without regard to the amount of damages.
For some time a controversy existed as to whether or not this obligatory passenger insurance is compatible with the Warsaw Convention. Some
authors felt it amounted to a more severe liability on the carrier and was,
therefore, contrary to the convention." These objections, however, are not
justified for the obligatory insurance does not change the system of liability
set up by the convention. Instead, it is merely a condition imposed as an
incident to the license for scheduled services. This legal point of view is
now generally recognized at least as far as German carriers are concerned. "
Doubts do exist whether foreign carriers doing business in the Federal
Republic are obliged to take out such accident insurance for their passengers."9 However, this obligation would be in keeping with Article 11
of the Chicago Convention by which the law of each state applies to
foreign aircraft operating there. In spite of decisions that the bilateral
agreements of the Federal Republic forbid such obligatory insurance, the
wording of Section 50 of the Air Code is imprecise and might allow the
interpretation that only German carriers are bound to insure their passengers. The more recent regulations for the admission to aviation" try
to alleviate this uncertainty to some extent. They require insurance for
all charter flights and for other transportation, provided that the passengers travel from one point in the Federal Republic to another (cabo5

The official bill, Bundestagsdrucksache IV/1646, at 10, IS Nov. 1963, does not explain why
this rule is not incorporated into the German law.
asRiEsE, op. cit. supra note 35, at 493; ABRAHAM, LUFTBEFOERIERUNGSVERTRAG 77 (1955).
For a general discussion of the problem see Bodenschatz, 1959 ZLR 230, 244; Rinck, 1958
DER BETRIEB 243.

"SMEYER, FUENF JAHRZEHNTE 346, 443 (1953); Moeller, 1955 ZLR 251 (German National
Report for the Congress of Comparative Law, 1954); Bodenschatz, 1959 ZLW 247. Resolution by
the legal committee of the advisory council for aviation (Luftfahrtbeirat), reprinted in 1960 ZLW
94. The highest civil court has held the same in dictum. Bundesgerichtshof, 14 May 1963, reprinted
in 1963 ZLW 296; Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1926 (1963). The main substance of the judgment deals with the relation between social security and passenger accident insurance.
5
"Bodenschatz, 1959 ZLW 248.
'9Bundesgesetzbl 1, 370 (Ger. 1964), reprinted in 1964 ZLW 326.
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tage). However, the bulk of international passenger service comprises
traffic arriving, departing, or passing through the Federal Republic. These
lines remain free from this obligatory insurance. In this respect, the
Federal Republic has placed foreign carriers on a better footing than
the German ones.
C. Misuse Of Rights
According to German law, behavior contrary to previously demonstrated acts or omissions will be accorded no legal significance. One who
does such inconsistent acts will be prevented from denying his prior conduct. This rule has been generally accepted as part of the German law
for the last thirty years." German courts have several times set aside the
time limit of two years provided for in Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. The typical situation is where the carrier assures a passenger that
it will not plead the two year time limit. If the carrier is guilty of such
actions, damage can be claimed and awarded after the time limit has
expired." Even if the carrier's insurance company made the assuring promise, the time limit of Article 29 will be disregarded." The highest civil
court went even further in holding that the time limit might be set
aside if the carrier withheld from the passenger the names and addresses
of other passengers who might be called as witnesses in court. In that way,
the carrier would impede the passenger's law suit, and by doing so, forfeit
its rights under Article 29."
The Warsaw Convention is to some extent supplemented, if not
amended, by national German law through these decisions. Admittedly,
national, law applies wherever no provisions applicable to a specific case
may be found in the Warsaw Convention, as for instance with regard to
details of the contract for transportation or for defining the term damage."
The question, however, is whether Article 29 contains such an omission.
The law establishes a strict time limit which is more rigid than a prescription." It is generally recognized that the parties may waive a prescription, but never a strict time limit. The court, therefore, considers a
time limit irrespective of the parties' pleadings. All courts, including
Germany's, regard this time limit as a strict one as opposed to plain prescription." It is undoubtedly the object of Article 29 to establish a time
limit which shall not be influenced by what the parties do or say.
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64Bundesgerichtshof, 17 April 1958, vol. 27, p. 101, reprinted in 1958 ZLR 421, 425. The
court held that there was no misuse in rights.
65 RIESE, Op. cit. supra note 35, at 423, 468; 1 SCHLEICHER, REYMANN & ABRAHAM, Op. cit.
supra note 30, at 254.
66 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (Warsaw Convention), 13 Feb. 1933, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (effective 29 Oct. 1934).
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"8Tribunal de Grande Instance de la Seine, judgment of 14 April 1961, 1961 RFDA 198;
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An additional argument is found in Article 29, paragraph 2 of the
convention which refers to the lex fori for the calculation of the time
limit, but not for its consequences. The rules regarding the misuse of rights
are not part of the rules of procedure." Therefore, it cannot be argued
that the concept of the misuse of rights is part of the lex fori and, therefore, prevailing over the Warsaw Convention. In Anglo-Saxon law the
situation is different, for the problem discussed comes under the law of
estoppel."0 Since the law of estoppel is a rule of procedure, it certainly has
priority over the time limit stipulated in Article 29 of the convention.
This argument, however, is not applicable in German law. Nevertheless,
the German courts went far in construing Article 29 by interpreting
it according to German principles and thus limiting its field of application. It remains doubtful, however, whether the courts of other contracting States would restrict the application of Article 29 to the same extent.
Divergencies are often inevitable in the interpretation of international
treaties. Apart from the remote possibility of stipulating submission to
the International Court of Justice, the regretable and undisputable fact
is that the courts of each country apply their own method of interpretation.71 In fact, the courts cannot do otherwise as long as there exists no
international court with appellate jurisdiction. Although the Warsaw Convention is written in French, except for grammatical construction no court
is bound to construe the convention according to French jurisprudence or
method. The courts, therefore, are bound to interpret the Warsaw Convention in accordance with their domestic methods of jurisdiction.2
Consequently, the German courts have been correct in expounding
their conception of time limit as taken from German law. It cannot be
said that the doctrine of misuse of rights has had, in general, priority over
the conception of time limit." The object of the time limit must be taken
into consideration. It must be distinguished whether the time limit is
established in the interest of the carrier or in some general interest. If the
general interest prevails and if it is desirable not to overburden the courts
with too many suits, then the time limit must be applied even if the carrier
had acted in an unfair way. If on the other hand the time limit is meant
to serve the interest of the carrier, it then forfeits the protection of the
law if, in some unfair way, the carrier prevented the passenger from
initiating proceedings in time." It is generally recognized that in the
Warsaw Convention, the time limit is meant to protect the carrier." If,
therefore, the carrier or one of its agents induces the passenger by what& SIEBERT, Op. cit. supra note 61, at § 242 n.121.
70 ScHNITZER, VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSLEHKE 417, 421 (1961);
69SOERGEL
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reprinted in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1405 (1963).

116

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 33

ever means to let the time limit elapse, then the carrier deserves no protection. It cannot invoke the time limit.
The restriction inserted in Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention by
German courts and German doctrine is not based on an alleged priority
of German rules. It is instead a consequence of the inevitable application
of national doctrine in interpreting international legal concepts. This
national influence will be felt as long as the international conventions
cannot define their respective provisions in legal terms which would be
accepted by all parties-an object which is almost impossible to attain.
As a natural result of air transport being carried on as a state-owned
public utility, air transport within the Federal Republic is highly regulated
by the government. This control goes far toward eliminating the diverse
regulations to which airlines in the United States are subject. In addition,
Germany has made great progress in applying the international character
of aviation by limiting the differences between domestic and foreign air
carriers.

